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PAY TO PLAY?  THE ENFORCEABILITY OF CONDITIONAL 
EXCULPATORY CONTRACTS FOR STUDENT ATHLETES 
Stephen Richardson Donat* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
High school athletic programs offer students a valuable extracurricular 
education that would otherwise be unavailable as a part of the required 
curriculum.  Of the approximate fifteen million high school students in the 
United States,1 over half participate on an athletic team of some kind.2  
Unfortunately, injuries are an innate characteristic of athletics.  Injury 
statistics from the most popular high school sports teams3 show that each 
year, approximately two million injuries are sustained.4  Out of those two 
million injured, 500,000 seek medical attention5 and 30,000 are 
hospitalized.6  Yet, participation is at an all-time high.7  As society continues 
to evolve and recreational entertainers continue to require exculpatory 
contracts, voluntary participants seemingly have become increasingly less 
 
* J.D., 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law. 
 1  Fast Facts, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id 
=372 (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
 2   Probability of Competing Beyond High School, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/probability-competing-beyond-high-school 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
 3  John W. Powell & Kim D. Barber-Foss, Injury Patterns in Selected High School 
Sports: A Review of the 1995–1997 Seasons, 34 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 277 (1999) 
(showcasing injury statistics from the top ten high school sports: football, wrestling, baseball, 
field hockey, softball, girls’ volleyball, boys’ and girls’ basketball, and boys’ and girls’ 
soccer). 
 4  Id. 
 5  Id. 
 6  Id.  See also Sports Injury Statistics, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., 
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/healthlibrary/conditions/pediatrics/sports_injury_statistics
_90,P02787 (last visited Feb. 27, 2019) (illustrating the statistics of adolescent sports injuries 
that result in emergency room visits, traumatic brain injuries, and death). 
 7  Compare NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’N, NFHS HANDBOOK 2016–17 
(2017), http://nfhs.org/media/1017531/2016-17-nfhs-handbook.pdf, with NAT’L FED’N OF 
STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’N, NFHS HANDBOOK 1969–2014 (2014), 
http://www.nfhs.org/ParticipationStatics/PDF/Participation%20Survey%20History%20Boo
k.pdf, and NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’N, NFHS HANDBOOK 2014–15 (2015), 
http://www.nfhs.org/ParticipationStatics/PDF/2014-15_Participation_Survey_Results.pdf, 
and NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’N, NFHS HANDBOOK 2015–16 (2016), 
http://www.nfhs.org/ParticipationStatistics/PDF/2015-16_Sports_Participation_Survey.pdf. 
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hesitant about waiving liability.8  As a result, individuals are beginning to 
question whether these conditional waivers have any legal significance or if 
they are just a mere formality implemented to deter the injured from pursuing 
legal action.9 
In today’s increasingly litigious culture, it is essential that student 
athletes sign liability waivers or pre-injury releases as a condition of 
participation.10  Schools require exculpation in order to shift the risk from 
themselves to the participants who, by entering into such contracts, expressly 
agree to assume the risk of injury.11  In so conditioning participation upon 
this contractual relationship, these agreements reduce the risks, and therefore 
the costs, of extracurricular activities12 and are more cost-effective than 
insuring against the likelihood of such claims.13  In the context of 
extracurricular athletics, exculpatory contracts are also important to the 
students.  Assent from the participant provides evidence of a conscious 
decision to voluntarily join in the sport, to accept the foreseeable 
consequences of that particular activity, and to forego future claims or causes 
of action that may arise in the event of injury.14 
Of course, exculpatory contracts cannot protect against all potential 
claims.15  Furthermore, unless the contract is conspicuously drafted so that a 
 
 8  See generally Joshua D. Arters & Ben M. Rose, Kindly Remove my Child from the 
Bubble Wrap—Analyzing Childress v. Madison County and Why Tennessee Courts Should 
Enforce Parental Pre-Injury Liability Waivers, 11 TENN. J. L. & POL’Y 8, 9 (2016). 
 9  Id. 
 10  For the purposes of this Comment, liability waivers, hold harmless clauses, and similar 
exculpatory releases are referred to as exculpatory contracts. 
 11  BRUCE B. HRONEK & JOHN O. SPENGLER, LEGAL LIABILITY IN RECREATION AND 
SPORTS 77 (Sagamore 2d ed. 2002). 
 12  Arters & Rose, supra note 8, at 55–56. 
 13  Kirton v. Fields, 997 So. 2d 349, 363 (Fla. 2008) (Wells, J., dissenting) (observing that 
insuring against the probability of injuries sustained while participating in public school 
events is not a realistic alternative because the high costs of doing so “deplete already very 
scarce resources”). 
 14  See generally Authorization & Waiver by Parent(s) or Legal Guardian(s) of Minor 
Child, 16 COMPLETE L. 35 (1999) (showcasing an example of a boilerplate exculpatory 
contract).  Even though student athletes are the ones who are directly affected, schools within 
the United States generally require the parent(s) or guardians(s) of minor students to waive 
such liability over their child’s claims.  See, e.g., Doe v. Banos, 966 F. Supp. 2d 477, 479 
(D.N.J. 2013) (reaffirming the constitutionality of the Haddonfield Board of Education’s 
school policy requiring parents to consent to a “24/7 [p]olicy” as a prerequisite to their 
children’s participation in extracurricular activities and school sponsored sports teams).  The 
validity of parental waivers in the context of extracurricular athletics will not be addressed in 
this Comment. 
 15  St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Universal Builders Supply, 409 F. 3d. 73, 83–87 
(2d Cir. 2005) (holding that protection from reckless, grossly negligent, or intentional conduct 
that results in injury is against public policy); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 
1981) (en banc) (holding that exculpatory contracts which attempt to insulate a party from 
liability, “in no event will . . . shield against a claim for willful and wanton negligence”). 
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reasonable person is able to appreciate its terms, the agreement is deemed 
unenforceable.16  Likewise, courts justify the invalidation of conditional 
exculpatory contracts as offending public policy only where its enforcement 
would adversely impact the fundamental concerns to the whole of society.17 
Conditional exculpatory contracts for student athletes are unique, and 
differing views of public policy have created a rift in their enforceability 
across the country.  One understanding is that a student’s choice to 
participate in an extracurricular activity is a voluntary decision in a non-
essential activity, and therefore, any conditional exculpatory agreement that 
may be required as a prerequisite for participation is otherwise enforceable.18  
The other understanding is that extracurricular activities are 
indistinguishable from the rest of the curriculum, i.e., since the field is an 
extension of the classroom, such conditional exculpatory contracts are void 
and unenforceable.19  Under this latter view, because there is no difference 
between curricular classes and extracurricular activities, invalidation is 
warranted because a student’s voluntary participation in an extracurricular 
activity is thought to be just as important to that student’s education as well 
as the school’s overall educational scheme as is the curriculum.20  As a result 
of this divide, a student athlete in one jurisdiction would have a claim that a 
similarly situated student athlete in another jurisdiction would not. 
This Comment examines whether public policy may invalidate 
conditional exculpatory contracts between schools and student athletes.  Part 
II of this Comment summarizes the public policy considerations argued by 
litigants and adopted by certain courts to invalidate mandatory exculpatory 
contracts.  This Part describes the idea of extending the public interest 
beyond the bounds of the traditional curriculum and argues that a traditional 
education and the option to participate in extracurricular athletics is not so 
intertwined as to justify a concern to the whole of society, therefore 
triggering the public interest.  Part III of this Comment reviews various 
methods courts use to determine the existence of the public interest and its 
impact in the extracurricular context.  Because it is unclear what tests courts 
should apply, this Part discusses and analyzes the two most popular 
approaches.  Part IV of this Comment discusses these two methods through 
an examination of the analyses adopted by Washington in Wagenblast v. 
Odessa School District,21 by California in Hohe v. San Diego Unified School 
 
 16  See Anderson v. Regis Corp., 185 Fed. App’x 768 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 17  Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968, 970 (Wash. 1988). 
 18  See Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 745 (Mass. 2002). 
 19  See Wagenblast, 758 P.2d 968 at 970. 
 20  Id. at 972. 
 21  Id. 
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District,22 and by Massachusetts in Sharon v. City of Newton.23  Part V 
ultimately rejects Washington’s approach and urges for the adoption of the 
hybrid approach applied in Massachusetts.  Finally, Part VI concludes that 
the public interest does not extend to instances when schools condition 
exculpation of liability for student participation in extracurricular athletics, 
and doing so does not conflict with public policy and should be a permissible 
means for schools to protect themselves against liability. 
II. FOR THE GREATER GOOD OF THE COMMUNITY 
A. Public Policy as Gatekeeper to the Public Interest in Athletics 
Although the idea of public policy is open-ended, that term is widely 
understood as being synonymous with the public good.24  Traditionally, the 
forces behind the invocation of the “policy of the law” to invalidate a 
contract were aimed at agreements that tended to promote litigation or 
restrict competition.25  It was, and still is, important for courts to promote the 
public welfare by refusing to enforce contracts that conflict with society’s 
moral principles while protecting the freedom to contract.  Therefore, courts 
are often presented with public interest arguments when determining the 
validity of contracts and generally hold that for a contract to be void as 
against public policy, its enforcement must be violative of the public good.26 
Public policy as a means to invalidate conditional exculpatory contracts 
protects the public from the harms of overly broad, confounding, and 
complex waivers.  In doing so, courts determine whether the language of the 
contract is inconspicuous and therefore contrary to public policy.  An 
important consideration is whether the participant has been put on notice as 
to what is contained in the terms of the exculpatory agreement as well as 
what is ultimately being waived.  Illustrated in Atkins v. Swimwest Family 
Fitness Center,27 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin invalidated Swimwest’s 
conditional exculpatory contract because Swimwest’s exculpatory language 
was vague.28  In Atkins, Swimwest served as a private health and fitness 
 
 22  274 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
 23  769 N.E.2d 738 (Mass. 2002). 
 24  See Nat’l Bank of Com. v. Greenberg, 258 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Tenn. 1953); see also 
Wallihan v. Hughes, 82 S.E.2d 553, 558 (Va. 1954) (describing the idea of public policy as a 
“will-o’-the-wisp of the law [that] varies and changes with the interests, habits, need, 
sentiments and fashions of the day”); Hanks v. McDannel, 210 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Ky. 1948) 
(recognizing the aim of public policy as “the protection and promotion of the public welfare, 
including public health and looking to the protection and advancement of morality”). 
 25  WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 286 (Arthur Corbin ed., 3d 
Am. ed. 1919). 
 26  See, e.g., Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199 (1927). 
 27  691 N.W.2d 334 (Wis. 2005). 
 28  Id. at 343. 
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facility, equipped with a swimming pool, that was available to the public as 
both members and non-members.29  When Dr. Charis Wilson visited this 
facility as part of a physical therapy and rehabilitation regimen, she was 
required to fill out a guest registration form before being allowed access.30  
Swimwest’s guest registration form contained exculpatory language that 
shifted all liability to the guest and required but a single signature for both 
non-member registration as well as exculpation.31  After filling out the 
required paperwork, Wilson was last seen entering the pool by the on-duty 
lifeguard.32  In a matter of minutes, Wilson’s body was taken from the bottom 
of the pool, and she died one day later.33 
In looking for guidance from an earlier Wisconsin case with a similar 
issue,34 Atkins adopted a two-pronged approach to determine the validity of 
Swimwest’s contract.  Unpredictably, the first prong is not a determination 
of whether an activity encompasses general categories of risk, but rather 
whether the participant likely contemplated a specific risk before assuming 
all liability.35  Therefore, the court first looked to whether Swimwest 
“clearly, unambiguously, and unmistakably inform[ed] the signer of what 
[was] being waived.”36  Here, the court reasoned that an ordinary participant 
would not have clearly understood that the guest registration form’s 
exculpatory language applied to all others’ negligent and intentional acts,37 
and held that the breadth of the waiver made it problematic to determine what 
was within Wilson’s contemplation at the time she registered.38 
 
 29  Id. at 336. 
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. at 337 (“Waiver Release Statement[:] I agree to assume all liability for myself 
without regard to fault, while at Swimwest Family Center.  I further agree to hold harmless 
Swimwest Fitness Center, or any of its employees for any conditions or injury that may result 
to myself while at the Swimwest Fitness Center.  I have read the foregoing and understand its 
contents.”). 
 32  See id. 
 33  See Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 691 N.W. 2d 334, 337 (Wis. 2005).  The 
attendant coroner listed drowning as the cause of death.  Id. 
 34  Yauger v. Skiing Enters., 557 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1996) (dealing with the wrongful death 
of a minor at the Hidden Valley Ski Resort and the enforceability of the corresponding 
exculpatory agreement required by that resort). 
 35  See Atkins, 691 N.W.2d at 341 (noting that Wilson most likely would not have 
contemplated “drowning in a four-foot deep pool with a lifeguard on duty”). 
 36  Id. at 339 (emphasis added). 
 37  See id. at 340 (justifying this determination because Swimwest’s use of the word 
“fault” is all-encompassing and potentially barred any non-member’s claims arising under 
any scenario); see also Dobratz v. Thomson, 468 N.W.2d 654, 661 (Wis. 1991) (“Only if it is 
apparent that the parties, in light of all the circumstances, knowingly agreed to excuse the 
defendants from liability will the contract be enforceable.”); Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric. 
Soc’y, 330 N.W.2d 773, 777–78 (Wis. 1983) (holding that if an exculpatory contract fails to 
express the intent of the parties “with particularity[,]” such a contract will not be enforced). 
 38  See Atkins, 691 N.W.2d at 341. 
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The second prong asks whether the contract “alert[ed] the signer to the 
nature and significance of what is being signed.”39  Again, the court held that 
it would be unclear to an ordinary participant whether Swimwest’s form was 
a guest registration, an exculpatory contract, or a hybrid of both.40  Holding 
the contract unenforceable, Atkins reasoned that Swimwest could have 
required non-members to sign an exculpatory contract separate and apart 
from the registration form, which would have clearly identified these two 
documents and provided Wilson with adequate notice of the exculpation, 
guarding against her inadvertent assent to its terms.41  Ultimately, the court 
reasoned that the exculpatory language appeared to be a part of the larger 
guest registration and that Wilson could not have reasonably agreed to 
Swimwest’s exculpation.42 
B. A Patchwork of Public Policy: Individualized Jurisdictional 
Justifications 
In New York, statutes have been enacted for the protection of the public 
from unfair exculpation under the belief that contracts that eliminate liability 
altogether are per se invalid.43  Section 5-326 of New York’s General 
Obligations Law holds that exculpatory contracts that seek to exempt 
“pool[s], gymnasium[s], place[s] of amusement or recreation, or similar 
establishment[s]” from liability for negligence are void as against public 
policy and wholly unenforceable.44  As a result, New York courts broadly 
apply this law to invalidate exculpation in several different categories of 
extracurricular and recreational activities.45 
Connecticut also has a unique way of invalidating exculpatory contracts 
that purport to waive liability from public voluntary participation in various 
activities.  Justifying invalidation on public policy principles, Connecticut 
protects the public interest in voluntarily participating in various 
nonessential activities as well.46  For example, Hanks v. Powder Ridge 
 
 39  Yauger, 557 N.W.2d at 63 (emphasis added). 
 40  See Atkins, 691 N.W.2d at 336. 
 41  See id. at 341. 
 42  See id. at 343. 
 43  N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-326 (2018). 
 44  Id. 
 45  See Williams v. City of Albany, 706 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (flag 
football); Petrie v. Bridgehampton Rd. Races Corp., 670 N.Y.S.2d 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) 
(dirt bike racing); Rogowicki v. Troser Mgmt., 623 N.Y.S.2d 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) 
(skiing); Brancati v. Bar-U-Farm, Inc., 583 N.Y.S.2d 660 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (horseback 
riding); Miranda v. Hampton Auto Raceway, Inc., 515 N.Y.S.2d 291 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) 
(automobile racing); Wurzer v. Seneca Sport Parachute Club, 411 N.Y.S.2d 763 (N.Y App. 
Div. 1978) (parachute jumping). 
 46  See, e.g., Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 849 A.2d 813 (Conn. 2004) 
(recognizing the existence of the public interest in promoting the public’s participating in 
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Restaurant Corporation47 held that, because participation in various 
“recreational activities, such as snowtubing, skiing, basketball, soccer, 
football, racquetball, karate, ice skating, swimming, volleyball[,] or yoga” 
constitutes an “important and healthy part of everyday life” of a vast majority 
of the population, the conditional requirement of exculpation results in a 
violation of public policy, and therefore such contracts are void and 
unenforceable.48  Overall, these jurisdictions rely, in a unique manner, on 
public policy as a means to protect individuals from inappropriate, overly 
broad, or inconspicuous exculpatory contracts. 
C. Public Policy and the Parameters of the Public Interest in 
Education 
Individual state constitutions require its respective governing body to 
provide an education for its youth,49 thereby establishing the existence of an 
“overwhelming public interest in education.”50  It is no surprise, therefore, 
that courts note the importance that schools play in the upbringing of 
children.51  While there is an indisputably clear and present public interest in 
education, the question remains whether that interest extends beyond the 
curriculum.  As a result, there are different boundaries as to how far the 
public interest in education extends. 
It is widely recognized that youth participation in extracurricular 
athletics improves students’ physical skills and abilities, and supplements 
their curricular development, education, socialization, and contentment.52  
Further, the lessons that coaches foster contribute to student athletes’ 
persistence beyond the athletic field and, thus, positively correlate to their 
chances for success after graduation.53  Participation in extracurricular 
 
skiing); Jaworski v. Kiernan, 696 A.2d 332, 337–38 (Conn. 1997) (recognizing the existence 
of the public interest in promoting the public’s participation in recreational athletics). 
 47  885 A.2d 734 (Conn. 2005). 
 48  Id. at 746. 
 49  E.g., N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, ¶ 1 (“The legislature shall provide for the maintenance 
and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all 
the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years.”). 
 50  Clifton v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 11-03640, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61569, at *29 
(N.D. Cal. 2012); see also Dorsett v. Bd. of Trs. for State Colls. and Univs., 940 F.2d 121, 
125 (5th Cir. 1991) (recognizing a public interest in education); Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 
426, 432 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).  
 51  See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535–36 (1925) (allowing parents to 
pursue private or public school options for their children and suggesting that there is no 
institution that is a more intimate part of our traditional life than schools). 
 52  See, e.g., The Case for High School Activities, NAT’L FED’N ST. HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, 
https://www.nfhs.org/articles/the-case-for-high-school-activities/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
 53  See, e.g., Mike Krings, Study Shows High School Athletes Perform Better in School, 
Persist to Graduation More than Non-Athletes, UNIV. KAN. TODAY (Jan. 24, 2014), 
https://news.ku.edu/2014/01/15/study-shows-high-school-athletes-performed-better-school-
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athletics also encourages the retention of students who would otherwise drop 
out of school but for their proclivity and enthusiasm for athletics.54  
Therefore, student involvement in extracurricular activities positively 
impacts their education, and participation should continue to be encouraged.  
But are these desirable results enough to justify an extension of the public 
interest outside of the classroom and onto the field? 
There are few differences between the many benefits student athletes 
receive and the benefits conveyed by compelled physical education 
programs.55  While both programs strive for students to develop the 
fundamental knowledge and skills necessary to continue a lifetime of healthy 
activity, physical education is first introduced into the curriculum during 
elementary school while the opportunity to participate in extracurricular 
athletics tends to be present only in high school.56  Unlike physical education, 
high school students are not required to participate in extracurricular 
athletics but rather can make the decision to attend and participate in physical 
 
persisted-graduation-more-nonApr. 
 54  See id. 
 55  Compare Grace Chen, 10 Reasons Why High School Sports Benefit Students, PUB. 
SCH. REV., https://www.publicschoolreview.com/blog/10-reasons-why-high-school-sports-
benefit-students (last updated Aug. 28, 2018), and Paige Maslen, The Social and Academic 
Benefits of Team Sports, EDUTOPIA (Dec. 29, 2015), 
https://www.edutopia.org/discussion/social-and-academic-benefits-team-sports, with Admin. 
Rules of Mont. 10.58.520 (2015), http://www.mtrules.org/gateway/ruleno.asp?RN=10%2E5 
8%2E520 (defining “physical education” as a program requiring the “demonstrate[ion of] 
competent motor skill performance in a variety of physical activities[,] . . . strategies to help 
students demonstrate responsible personal and social behaviors including mutual respect, 
support of others, safety, and cooperation that promote[s] positive relationships and a 
productive learning environment[,] . . . [and the] demonstrate[ion of] knowledge and use of 
instructional strategies to enhance communication among students in physical activity 
settings”); AL DEP’T OF EDUC., ALABAMA COURSE OF STUDY: PHYSICAL EDUCATION 2 (2009) 
https://web.alsde.edu/general/HPE_2009_AL_Course_of_Study_Physical_Education.pdf 
(recognizing skill development, cognitive development, social development, and physical 
activity and health as the “fundamental components necessary for achieving the goal of 
excellence in physical education.”); GA DEP’T OF EDUC., GEORGIA PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
FOR PHYSICAL EDUCATION 5 (2008), https://www.georgiastandards.org/standards/GPS%20Su 
pport%20Docs/Physical_Education_Standards_4-30-09.pdf (outlining the components to 
“quality physical education[,]” including “skill development . . . regular, healthful physical 
activity . . . [and] improved physical fitness”). 
 56  See COLO. DEP’T OF EDUC., COLORADO ACADEMIC STANDARDS: COMPREHENSIVE 
HEALTH & PHYSICAL EDUCATION (2009), https://www.cde.state.co.us/sites/default/files/docu 
ments/cohealthpe/documents/health_pe_standards_adopted_12.10.09.pdf; See LYNN J. 
HOUSE ET AL., MISS. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2013–2014 MISSISSIPPI PHYSICAL EDUCATION 
FRAMEWORK 4 (2013), https://www.mdek12.org/sites/default/files/Offices/MDE/Home_Page 
/mississippi-physical-education-framework.pdf; The Case for High School Activities, NAT’L 
FED’N ST. HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, https://www.nfhs.org/articles/the-case-for-high-school-
activities/ (last visited May 15, 2019); 2013–2014 MISSISSIPPI PHYSICAL EDUCATION 
FRAMEWORK 4 (2013), https://www.mdek12.org/sites/default/files/Offices/MDE/Home_Page 
/mississippi-physical-education-framework.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
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education in order to fulfill curricular requirements.57  This differentiating 
characteristic has caused some jurisdictions to limit the extension of public 
policy considerations when determining the enforceability and validity of 
conditional exculpatory contracts in extracurricular activities. 
III. THE REACH OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN EDUCATION 
When determining whether the public interest is affected by the 
enforcement of conditional exculpatory contracts, courts have not yet 
universally adopted a clear-cut test.  As a result, courts either formulate their 
own methods through a dissection of pre-existing approaches or cherry-pick 
certain factors for consideration, resulting in a patchwork of individualized 
enforcement.58  The first court to lay out an analytical scheme was the 
Supreme Court of California in Tunkl v. Regents of University of 
California.59  Since Tunkl, various jurisdictions have adopted what are 
known as the Tunkl factors when determining the outer limits of public 
interest.60 
Other jurisdictions refuse to invalidate conditional exculpatory 
contracts in the context of recreational activities under public policy 
considerations.61  In Maryland, Wolf v. Ford62 expressly rejected complete 
reliance on the Tunkl factors.63  Instead, that court concluded that the ultimate 
determination of what constitutes the public interest can be made only after 
a consideration of the “totality of the circumstances” against the backdrop of 
society’s expectations.64  While jurisdictions rely on the general rule that 
“[e]xculpatory agreements in the recreational sports context do not implicate 
 
 57  See Eileen O’Brien & Mary Rollefson, Extracurricular Participation and Student 
Engagement, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (1995), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs95/95741.pdf. 
 58  See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) (introducing a 
six-factor inquiry to justify its determination that a conditional exculpatory contract had 
adversely affected the public interest); Wolf v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522 (Md. 1994) (adopting a 
unique totality of the circumstances test); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981) (en 
banc) (cherry-picking four factors from other courts that had resolved similar issues). 
 59  383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). 
 60  See generally Storm v. NSL Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d 874 (Del. Super. Ct. 
2005); Moore v. Hartley Motors, 36 P.3d 628 (Alaska 2001). 
 61  See, e.g., Henderson v. Quest Expeditions, Inc., 174 S.W.3d 730, 733 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2005), overruled on other grounds by Copeland v. Healthsouth/Methodist Rehab. Hosp., LP, 
565 S.W.3d 260 (Tenn. 2018) (“[M]any jurisdictions have recognized that . . . recreational 
sporting activities are not activities of an essential nature which would render exculpatory 
clauses contrary to the public interest.”); Seigneur v. Nat’l Fitness Inst., Inc., 752 A.2d 631, 
641 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (following the trend that “courts from other jurisdictions 
almost universally have held that contracts relating to recreational activities do not fall within 
any of the categories that implicate public interest concerns” (citations omitted)). 
 62  644 A.2d 522 (1994). 
 63  See id. at 527. 
 64  Id. 
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the public interest and therefore are not void as against public policy,”65 the 
determination of whether the public interest is present and affected is the first 
and most important step in any judicial analysis. 
A. Tunkl v. Regents of University of California66 
Although the conditional exculpatory contract in Tunkl did not bar 
participation in extracurricular athletics, the court nevertheless laid out a 
suggestive rubric to identify the existence of the public interest, and indicated 
certain types of transactions in which exculpation would be invalid due to an 
encroachment of public policy.67  Rather, Tunkl concerned the validity of a 
conditional exculpatory contract imposed upon a patient for admission to the 
University of California Los Angeles Medical Center (“UCLA Medical 
Center”).68  Before Tunkl was treated, he voluntarily entered into an 
agreement that set forth certain conditions for his admission, among which 
was exculpation which released the hospital “from any and all liability for 
the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its employees. . . .”69  Tunkl’s 
estate sought to recover damages for the personal injuries caused by the 
alleged negligence of the two attending physicians that ultimately resulted in 
his death.70 
Admitting that “no definition of the concept of public interest can be 
contained within the four corners of a formula,”71 Tunkl devised six separate 
categorical considerations that, if any or all exist, may justify the invalidation 
of conditional exculpation as against public policy: (1) whether the 
underlying bargain concerns an endeavor of a type generally thought suitable 
for public regulation; (2) whether the party seeking exculpation performs a 
service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical 
necessity; (3) whether the party seeking exculpation holds itself out as 
willing to perform that specific service for any member of the public; (4) 
whether, because of the essential nature of the service(s) offered, the party 
seeking exculpation possessed a decisive advantage of bargaining strength 
against any members of the public who sought such service; (5) whether, 
having exercised superior bargaining power, the party seeking exculpation 
confronted the public with a standardized adhesion contract and provided no 
provision whereby an interested party had the option to purchase additional 
 
 65  Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); see 
also Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) 
(“[R]ecreational sports do not constitute a public interest under Tunkl.”). 
 66  383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). 
 67  See generally id. 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. at 442. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. at 444. 
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protection against negligence; and (6) whether the party seeking the service 
was placed under the control of the exculpated party.72 
After the court determined that UCLA Medical Center’s contract 
exhibited all of the six factors, it ruled the contract unenforceable and 
categorically held that all hospital-patient exculpatory contracts fall within a 
general category of conditional agreements which may be unenforceable as 
against public policy.73  The Supreme Court of California justified its holding 
by recognizing the possibility that potential patients who may enter into 
exculpatory contracts with hospitals are not necessarily in a position to reject 
the terms of the conditional contract, and, in some cases, are not in a position 
to find an alternative treatment facility.74  In all, the court stated that these 
contracts result in patients who have placed themselves under the complete 
control of the hospital and therefore have become totally subject to the risk 
of its carelessness.75  Requiring patients to exculpate the hospital as a 
condition for eventual treatment is therefore against public policy.76 
B. Wolf v. Ford77 
Wolf v. Ford did not turn on the validity of an exculpatory contract 
involving extracurricular athletics either, but rather on the conditional 
exculpation of a securities investment firm by its client.78  After receiving a 
settlement stemming from a lawsuit arising from an automobile accident, 
Wolf retained Ford, a stockbroker, with the intent to invest and preserve her 
money.79  Wolf executed a contract that contained exculpatory language that 
exonerated Ford and his investment firm from “any and all liability for losses 
which may occur while [Ford is] acting on [Wolf’s] behalf except for such 
as may result from [Ford’s] gross negligence or willful misconduct.”80  
Pursuant to the contract, and in the normal course of business, Ford invested 
Wolf’s capital in various stock options.81  Upset with the associated returns 
of her portfolio, Wolf terminated her account and filed suit in an attempt to 
hold Ford accountable for his alleged negligence.82  Despite Wolf’s 
 
 72  See generally Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 444–46. 
 73  See id. at 447 (recognizing that “practical and crucial necessit[ies]” affect the public 
interest to the extent that patients may be in critical need of the offered service or skill of the 
hospital, whether private or public). 
 74  See id. 
 75  See id. 
 76  See id. 
 77  644 A.2d 522 (Md. 1993). 
 78  See generally id. 
 79  Id. at 524. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. 
 82  Id. 
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contention that her prior exculpation of Ford was void as against public 
policy, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court’s holding 
and enforced the contract, limiting Ford’s potential liability to any evidenced 
loss sustained by gross negligence or willful misconduct.83 
Maryland’s highest court highlighted that the concept of the public 
interest is “amorphous” and difficult to apply in order to invalidate 
exculpatory contracts.84  Wolf also expressly declined to limit its analysis to 
the Tunkl factor test because those six factors have a tendency to become 
“too rigid a measuring stick” when determining the existence of the public 
interest.85  Although Tunkl warned that its factors were only a “rough 
outline” to guide future courts as to whether conditional exculpation affected 
the public interest,86 Wolf seemed to take caution and indicated that strict 
dependence on the presence or absence of any of the Tunkl factors may be 
“arbitrary.”87  Not limiting itself to its six factors, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland declined to engage in a Tunkl analysis and held that the ultimate 
determination of the existence of the public interest, and whether or not it is 
affected, must be decided after an examination of the “totality of the 
circumstances.”88 
Because public policy precludes the enforcement of conditional 
exculpatory contracts that adversely affect the public interest, Wolf limited 
its recognition of the public interest to transactions that involve the 
“performance of a public service obligation.”89  Specific to its facts, Wolf 
reasoned that the securities industry is inherently risky and willing investors 
understand the degree of risk involved in that business.90  Wolf, therefore, 
stands for the concept that, unless the allocation of risk between the parties 
to a private contract is “patently offensive,” conditional exculpation is 
embraced under the freedom to contract in private matters.91 
 
 
 
 
 83  Wolf, 644 A.2d at 525. 
 84  Id. at 526. 
 85  Id. at 525–26. 
 86  Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1963). 
 87  Wolf, 644 A.2d at 527. 
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. at 526 (listing such services as “public utilities, common carriers, innkeepers, and 
public warehousemen”). 
 90  Id. at 528 (reasoning that “the possibility of poor performance of the securities chosen 
is precisely the sort of harm that is within the contemplation of the parties at the time they 
entered the agreement”). 
 91  Id. 
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IV. THE EXCULPATION OF LIABILITY INHERENT IN EXTRACURRICULAR 
ACTIVITIES 
Although Tunkl and Wolf did not deal with extracurricular athletics, 
three cases have dealt with the more specific issue of the existence of the 
public interest and whether it is affected when a school conditions 
exculpation on voluntary participation in extracurricular activities.92  In 
Wagenblast v. Odessa School District,93 the Supreme Court of Washington 
adopted the Tunkl factors to reach its conclusion.94  Looking no further than 
those six factors, Wagenblast concluded that conditional exculpation against 
future negligence claims in the extracurricular context are invalid based on 
a violation of public policy.95  In contrast, the California Court of Appeals 
discussed Tunkl and its six factors in Hohe v. San Diego Unified School 
District,96 but held that its circumstances presented an “entirely different 
situation” because the school did not require exculpation and therefore did 
not withhold any service.97  Similarly, in Sharon v. City of Newton,98 the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that because participation in 
extracurricular athletic programs is neither compelled by the school nor an 
essential element of education, the school’s requirement of an exculpatory 
contract as a prerequisite to voluntary participation did not offend public 
policy and is enforceable.99 
A. Wagenblast v. Odessa School District100 
In 1988, Washington became the first state to consider the validity of 
exculpatory contracts in schools as a prerequisite for participation in 
extracurricular athletic programs.101  In this consolidated case, students from 
different schools who desired to participate in extracurricular athletics were 
required to release their respective schools from any liability resulting from 
the ordinary negligence that arose from their voluntary participation.102  
Being a case of first impression in that jurisdiction, the court primarily 
looked to Tunkl for guidance and adopted its six-factor analysis to rationalize 
 
 92  Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 745 (Mass. 2002); Hohe v. San Diego 
Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 
758 P.2d 968, 970 (Wash. 1988). 
 93  758 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1988). 
 94  See id. at 971–75. 
 95  Id. at 969–70. 
 96  274 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 97  Id. at 649. 
 98  769 N.E.2d 738 (Mass. 2002). 
 99  See id. at 745. 
 100  758 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1988). 
 101  See id. 
 102  Id. at 969. 
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its exploration into whether the public interest was present and whether the 
contractual requirement adversely affected that interest.103 
Wagenblast examined the facts under each of the six Tunkl factors 
individually.104  First, because both of the defendant schools had the ability 
to delegate authority over extracurricular athletics to the Washington 
Interscholastic Activities Association (“WIAA”), and indeed looked to the 
WIAA for its regulatory standards, the court held that each conditional 
exculpatory contract concerned a type of activity generally thought suitable 
for public regulation.105  As to the first Tunkl factor, Wagenblast held that it 
had been satisfied because extracurricular athletic programs were a “fit 
subject for such regulation.”106 
Second, Wagenblast reasoned that extracurricular athletic programs are 
“part and parcel of the overall educational scheme in Washington” and held 
that such programs are a matter of great importance to the public.107  The 
court justified this conclusion by the total expenditure of time, effort, and 
money that Washington schools spent to maintain and progress 
extracurricular athletic programs.108  Further, the court detailed the 
“substantive” importance of extracurricular athletics to the community in 
that they “represent a significant tie of the public at large to [the educational 
system].”109  As a result of this enthusiasm, Wagenblast recognized that it 
would be unrealistic to view extracurricular athletics as an activity entirely 
separate and apart from the required curriculum.  In satisfying the second 
factor, the Wagenblast court made it clear that offering students the 
opportunity to participate in extracurricular activities is a great and important 
service to the public.110 
Third, the court indicated that the schools held themselves out as 
willing to perform this important public service in satisfaction of the next 
factor.111  Wagenblast justified this determination based on its understanding 
that extracurricular athletics are available to all students who satisfy internal 
eligibility standards such as maintaining academic and disciplinary good 
standing and having the requisite athletic skill necessary to participate at a 
competitive level.112 
 
 
 103  Id. at 971–72. 
 104  See generally id. 
 105  See id. at 972. 
 106  Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 972. 
 107  Id. 
 108  See id. 
 109  Id. 
 110  See generally id. 
 111  See id. at 973. 
 112  See Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973. 
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Fourth, the court held that both of the schools obtained “near-monopoly 
power” over extracurricular athletics due to its finding that there are few or 
no alternative athletic programs that possess the same attractions inherent in 
extracurricular sports.113  Similar to its justification for the second factor, the 
court held that the fourth factor was also satisfied, recognizing that athletics 
have grown to become of “considerable importance to students and the 
general public alike,”114 and as a result, both schools possessed distinct 
bargaining strength in requiring the participating student to enter into the 
exculpatory agreement.115 
Fifth, the court pointed out that the schools had rejected attempts by the 
student athletes to modify the terms of the conditional exculpatory 
agreements.116  In so finding, the court held that each school exercised 
superior bargaining power by offering its students an adhesion contract.117  
As a result of the procedures put in place, no student athlete was allowed to 
voluntarily participate in any extracurricular athletic activity without first 
releasing the school of liability by signing the contract on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis.118  Having admitted to an “unwavering policy” concerning the 
language and terms of the schools’ conditional exculpation, Wagenblast had 
little difficulty justifying the satisfaction of the fifth Tunkl factor.119 
Lastly, Wagenblast held that the student athletes were placed under the 
control of their schools, and as a result, were subjected to the school’s 
carelessness.120  Recognizing that schools owe a duty of care to students to 
anticipate foreseeable dangers and take reasonable precautions to protect 
them while under their control, the court reasoned that the schools subjected 
the students to certain foreseeable risks that resulted in a breach of that duty 
of care.121 
After a short analysis of the six Tunkl factors, Wagenblast held that both 
exculpatory contracts exhibited all six factors.122  Therefore, because the 
court found that the public interest was present and adversely affected, the 
two exculpatory contracts were ruled unenforceable.123 
 
 113  Id. 
 114  Id. 
 115  See id. 
 116  See id. 
 117  See id. 
 118  See Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973. 
 119  See id. 
 120  See id. 
 121  Id. 
 122  See id. 
 123  See id. 
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B. Hohe v. San Diego Unified School District124 
Two years after Washington’s decision in Wagenblast, California was 
tasked with a similar determination of whether public policy had been 
violated when a school conditioned student participation in an 
extracurricular activity on its exculpation.125  Hohe, a fifteen-year-old high 
school student, was required to enter into two separate exculpatory contracts 
in order to attend a hypnotism show sponsored by her school.126  After she 
was selected from a group of student volunteers, Hohe was hypnotized and 
sustained multiple injuries after sliding from her chair onto the ground 
throughout the demonstration.127 
The court ultimately rejected Hohe’s argument that the exculpatory 
contracts required by her school violated public policy.128  Looking to Tunkl, 
the court stated that the facts of the case presented an entirely different 
situation because, unlike Tunkl, the public interest was absent and therefore 
could not be implicated.129  Citing to the six Tunkl factors, Hohe reinforces 
that “[n]o public policy opposes private, voluntary transactions in which one 
party . . . agrees to shoulder a risk which the law would otherwise have 
placed upon the other party.”130 
After considering the language and scope of the two conditional 
exculpatory contracts at issue, the court indicated that invalidation would cut 
against public policy and highlighted the school’s apprehension and 
cautionary steps, which resulted in the various procedures put in place to 
protect Hohe and limit its own exposure to liability.131  Unlike the view 
expressed in Wagenblast, the Hohe court believed that the entire community 
benefits from the policies that require exculpation because such waivers 
enable schools to operate without the fear and omnipresent threat of 
overwhelming litigation costs.132  The court concluded that because Hohe 
and her father agreed to shoulder the risks of injury in two separate 
exculpatory agreements, public policy did not bar the transfer of liability and 
held each of the school’s exculpatory contracts enforceable.133 
 
 124  274 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
 125  See id. at 648. 
 126  See id. 
 127  See id. 
 128  See id. at 649. 
 129  See id. 
 130  Hohe, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 649 (citing Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 
446 (Cal. 1963)). 
 131  See id. (“The public as a whole receives the benefit of such waivers so that groups 
such as Boy and Girl Scouts, Little League, and parent-teacher associations are able to 
continue.”). 
 132  Id. (“Every learning experience involves risk.”). 
 133  See id. 
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C. Sharon v. City of Newton134 
More recently, Massachusetts faced the same issue.135  In Sharon, 
Newton North High School conditioned Sharon’s participation in the 
cheerleading team on its exculpation from liability.136  After she fell and 
fractured her arm during practice, Sharon brought suit to recoup the 
associated medical expenses, arguing that her school was nevertheless liable 
because the conditional exculpatory contract violated public policy and was 
unenforceable.137 
Similar to Hohe, Sharon considered policies that favored the 
enforcement of exculpatory contracts as well as the community’s 
encouragement surrounding extracurricular athletic programs.138  The court 
noted that shifting the foreseeable risk of negligently caused injury onto a 
student athlete as a condition of participation in a potentially dangerous 
activity “ordinarily contravenes no public policy” and that the enforcement 
of such exculpation was consistent with Massachusetts law.139 
In line with Tunkl, and having further considered the facts of the case 
against the backdrop of societal expectations, Sharon pointed out that the 
school’s exculpatory contract provided Sharon with the option to purchase 
supplemental accident insurance.140  The court also noted that the school’s 
exculpatory contract was “clearly labeled” and filled out by Sharon with the 
distinct purpose of ensuring her participation as a member of the Newton 
High School cheerleading team.141  Looking to whether the school possessed 
a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against interested student 
athletes,142 the court nevertheless reasoned that so conditioning a student 
athlete’s voluntary participation in a non-essential, extracurricular activity is 
enforceable.143  Through its analysis, Sharon ultimately adopted a totality of 
the circumstances approach and held that the public interest was not offended 
by the school’s requirement that an exculpatory contract be a prerequisite to 
 
 134  769 N.E.2d 738 (Mass. 2002). 
 135  See id. at 744. 
 136  Id. at 741. 
 137  Id. at 741–42. 
 138  Id. at 744. 
 139  Id. at 745. 
 140  See Sharon, 769 N.E.2d at 743 (indicating that the plaintiff explicitly declined to 
purchase the insurance); see also Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 
1963) (referencing Tunkl factor five). 
 141  Sharon, 769 N.E.2d at 743. 
 142  See Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445 (“As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the 
economic setting of the transaction, the [school district] possesses a decisive advantage of 
bargaining strength against [the student] who seeks [its] services.”). 
 143  See Sharon, 769 N.E.2d at 744; see also Minassian v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., 509 
N.E.2d 1190 (Mass. 1987). 
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voluntary participation its cheerleading team.144 
V. A CALL FOR UNIFORMITY 
It is the prerogative of the states to decide whether the public interest is 
present when students voluntarily participate in extracurricular activities.  As 
a result, there may never be uniformity on that front.  Washington’s 
individual analysis of the six Tunkl factors set forth in Wagenblast provides 
a short but persuasive stage for other courts.145  Wagenblast’s limited 
analysis, however, too narrowly focused its examination of the facts as they 
fit into the six Tunkl factors instead of considering other circumstances 
outside of the Tunkl universe.  Until there is consistency in the way courts 
determine the existence of the public interest, and whether or not that interest 
is affected, two competing views will persist.  It is my position that a third 
method—a hybrid of Tunkl’s six-factor approach and Sharon’s totality of the 
circumstances analysis—could resolve this issue and preserve the popularity 
and availability of extracurricular athletic programs while protecting 
schools’ interests. 
A. Washington’s Analysis in Wagenblast 
In all, Tunkl’s six-factor analysis steers courts in the right direction 
when deciding whether a public interest is present and affected.  Parts of 
Washington’s analysis, however, are flawed.  Wagenblast’s inquiry of 
factors one,146 three,147 and six148 is sound.  Consideration of the legislative 
enactments which granted each of the schools “the authority to control, 
supervise, and regulate the conduct of interscholastic athletics,”149 made it 
clear that all extracurricular athletic programs were a fit subject for public 
regulation in satisfaction of the first factor.  Similarly, there was no argument 
against fulfillment of the third factor because schools generally hold 
themselves out as willing to provide and perform the services associated with 
extracurricular athletic programs.150  Unlike privatized athletic programs 
 
 144  See Sharon, 769 N.E.2d at 745. 
 145  See generally Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1998). 
 146  See Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445 (determining whether the exculpatory contract “concerns a 
business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation”). 
 147  See id. (determining whether the school district “holds [itself] out as willing to perform 
this service for any [student] who seeks it, or at least for any [student] coming within certain 
established standards”). 
 148  See id. at 446 (determining whether “as a result of the transaction, the person or 
property of the [student athlete] is placed under the control of the [school district], subject to 
the risk of carelessness by the [school district] of [its] agents”). 
 149  Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 972. 
 150  See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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which have an ability to be more selective,151 the extracurricular activities 
offered by schools are made available to all students, regardless of wealth, 
who are able to satisfy certain skill and eligibility requirements.  Lastly, and 
in line with the inherent nature of extracurricular athletics, Wagenblast 
recognized that because student athletes are placed under the control of their 
schools, they are therefore subject to the risks of carelessness.152  The court’s 
determination—that a naturally occurring incident of any sports program is 
that the student athlete is placed under a substantial amount of his or her 
coach’s control153—is undeniable. 
Wagenblast’s analysis of the second factor,154 however, paved the way 
for the unnecessary invalidation of each of the schools’ conditional 
exculpatory contracts.  Had Washington extended its analysis beyond the 
rough outline provided by Tunkl, the court would have understood that, while 
schools undoubtedly perform a popular service by offering students the 
opportunity to voluntarily participate in extracurricular athletics, the 
importance of these extracurricular programs cannot be on equal footing 
with a traditional educational curriculum.  It would have followed that the 
limited public interest in education on which the court justified its holding 
would not have extended outside of the classroom.155  Further, because 
extracurricular athletics, by definition, are non-essential to a student’s 
education, Wagenblast could have found that, by conditioning participation 
upon exculpation, the schools did not withhold any advantages from non-
participating students because the same themes and benefits of 
extracurricular athletics are conveyed through the required curricular 
physical education programs.  It would follow that even if the public interest 
in education is present within the context of extracurricular athletics, it is not 
strong enough to invalidate conditional exculpatory contracts rooted in 
public policy. 
1. The Public Interest in Education Does Not Extend Beyond 
the Curriculum 
Under Wagenblast, Washington’s consideration of the second Tunkl 
factor consisted of an inquiry into whether such schools engaged in the 
performance of a service of great importance to the public.156  While there is 
no fundamental right for a student to participate in extracurricular 
 
 151  Sean Gregory, How Kids’ Sports Became a $15 Billion Industry, TIME (Aug. 24, 2017), 
http://time.com/4913687/how-kids-sports-became-15-billion-industry/.  
 152  See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 153  See Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973. 
 154  See Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445 (determining whether the party seeking exculpation “is 
engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public”). 
 155  Contra Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 972. 
 156  See id. 
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programs,157 it is undeniable that such activities nevertheless have 
educational value.158  Student athletes learn lessons through practice and 
competition that contribute and supplement the aims and focus of their 
curricula.  As a result of the total expenditure of time and effort by both 
schools and student athletes alike, Wagenblast held that extracurricular 
athletics are “part and parcel” of a school’s educational scheme and found 
no difference between the classes taught inside of classrooms and the lessons 
learned on the fields in which the students were injured.159 
This conclusion is misguided.  While extracurricular athletic programs 
are undoubtedly attractive to students and positively correlate with retention 
and graduation statistics, research shows that the intensive and excessive 
training inherent in extracurricular athletics can serve as an obstacle for 
academic advancement.160  Further, differentiating characteristics between 
required curricular courses and voluntary extracurricular activities also 
provide insight as to why the public interest in education does not extend to 
extracurricular activities.  For example, both athletic and academic 
extracurricular activities are nothing more than a supplement of the formal 
knowledge acquired within the classroom.161  Unlike its curricular 
counterparts, extracurricular activities are not graded and convey no 
academic credit toward the pursuit of graduation.  In addition, extracurricular 
activities traditionally take place before or after the school day.  It was a 
stretch for Wagenblast to find no differentiating characteristics between the 
curricular and extracurricular schemes of Washington’s schools and hold 
that there is a present public interest in extracurricular activities powerful 
enough to invalidate the conditional exculpatory contracts at issue in that 
case. 
 
 
 
 
 157  See generally Commonwealth by Packel v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n., 334 
A.2d 839, 842 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975); see also Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, 890 (Wash. 
1975). 
 158  See Sherwood v. Moxee Sch. Dist. No. 90, 363 P.2d 138, 144 (Wash. 1961) (Hill, J., 
concurring). 
 159  Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 972. 
 160  See Practical Considerations on Sport in Education, SPORTANDDEV.ORG, 
https://www.sportanddev.org/en/learn-more/education-and-child-and-youth-
development/practical-considerations-sport-education-0 (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
 161  See, e.g., NYSPHSAA, Inc. Bylaws and Eligibility Standards, N.Y. ST. PUB. HIGH SCH. 
ATHLETIC ASS’N, INC., http://www.nysphsaa.org/Portals/0/PDF/Handbook/2014-
2015%20Handbook/ByLaws%20and%20Eligibilty%20Standards%202014-2015%20Handb 
ook%209-13-14-2.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2019); Eligibility Rules, PA. INTERSCHOLASTIC 
ATHLETIC ASS’N, INC., https://www.piaa.org/schools/eligibility/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
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2. Extracurricular Activities do not Enjoy the Benefit of the 
Public Interest 
Washington’s analysis of the fourth Tunkl factor inquired into whether 
each school possessed a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against 
the students seeking to participate in the extracurricular activities being 
offered.162  In the most genuine way, extracurricular athletics strengthen and 
unite the public through athletics because players and fans represent their 
communities in solidarity.  Similar to collegiate and professional sports, 
community enthusiasm is what drives many extracurricular athletic 
programs and has established some of the longest rivalries in the United 
States.163  Even so, extracurricular athletics do not rise to affect the public 
interest in education because they are nonessential.164  Wagenblast notes that 
schools have a “near-monopoly power” on athletic programs and that, in 
most instances, no alternative program of organized competition exists.165  
That is simply not the case. 
Generally, physical education is a requirement for all schools in the 
United States.166  Similar to extracurricular athletics, physical education 
allows students to engage in the daily recommended amount of physical 
activity, and enables them to interact in a way that regular classrooms 
cannot.167  For example, physical literacy—a concept on which the national 
physical education standards are based—promotes the development of 
competence and confidence in a wide variety of physical activities.168  
Students would be at a great disadvantage if schools did not provide a 
requisite physical education that conveyed aptitude with respect to motor 
skills, movement patterns, and other personal and social behaviors.  While 
many students cannot afford private athletic programs where exculpatory 
releases may not be required,169 schools are nevertheless able to convey the 
 
 162  Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973. 
 163  See Sarajane Cedrone & Geoff Serra, The Nation’s Oldest High-School Football 
Rivalry, CONN. EXPLORED (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.ctexplored.org/the-nations-oldest-
high-school-football-rivalry/. 
 164  Extracurricular, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (Frederick C. Mish 
et al. eds., Miriam-Webster, Inc. 11th ed. 2003). 
 165  Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973. 
 166  Carrie Soucy, States that Require Physical Education, 
https://study.com/academy/popular/states-that-require-physical-education.html (last visited 
Apr. 2019). 
 167  Grant Shoffstall, Why Do Student Athletes Have to Take Gym Class?, DAILY AM. (Jan. 
27, 2016), https://www.dailyamerican.com/entertainment/highschoolhighlights/why-do-
student-athletes-have-to-take-gym-class/article_db445a95-bbe4-588b-9ebc-
3dcc6ca15134.html. 
 168  See National PE Standards, SHAPE AMERICA—SOCIETY OF HEALTH AND PHYSICAL 
EDUCATORS, https://www.shapeamerica.org/standards/pe/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
 169  Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973. 
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same educational benefits to students who opt not to participate in 
extracurricular athletics as a result of requiring physical education in their 
curricula. 
B. The Relationship Between Extracurricular Athletics and the 
Public Interest 
Cautioned by Wolf v. Ford,170 Wagenblast adopted the Tunkl factors but 
did not heed Maryland’s suggestion that those six considerations should not 
be dispositive, but rather used as a “rough outline” to guide the court’s 
determination of which exculpatory provisions could be found 
unenforceable.171  Ultimately, Wagenblast failed to conduct any other type 
of analysis or consider other factors outside of Tunkl,172 and its holding is 
based on this deficiency. 
Thankfully, a more thorough analysis was conducted by the court in 
Sharon where Massachusetts did not limit its examination, but instead 
looked to other relevant considerations in conjunction with a Tunkl 
analysis.173  In doing so, Sharon noted that it also considered the important 
policies of the state when analyzing public policy arguments.174  Through a 
unique approach, Sharon considered the Commonwealth’s longstanding 
tradition of favoring enforcement of exculpatory contracts.175  Here, the court 
recognized that “[a] party may, by agreement, allocate risk and exempt itself 
from liability that it might subsequently incur as a result of its own 
negligence.”176  Sharon also looked to Cormier v. Central Massachusetts 
Chapter of the National Safety Council,177 which stands for the proposition 
that placing the risk of a negligently caused injury on the injured participant 
“as a condition of that person’s voluntary choice to engage in a potentially 
dangerous activity” usually does not infringe upon the public policy of 
Massachusetts.178 
Another distinctive consideration was Sharon’s reflection upon the 
Commonwealth’s encouragement of the availability of youth-based 
extracurricular athletic programs.  The court noted that such encouragement 
is embodied in legislation which exempts providers from liability for 
 
 170  644 A.2d 522 (Md. 1993). 
 171  Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 972–73; Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 
444–45 (Cal. 1963). 
 172  Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 972–73. 
 173  See generally Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 743 (Mass. 2002). 
 174  See id. at 744. 
 175  See id. 
 176  Id. 
 177  620 N.E.2d 784 (Mass. 1993). 
 178  Id. at 786 (emphasis added). 
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negligence.179  Finally, while considering Sharon’s argument that if the 
exculpatory contract were enforced, there would be no mechanism in place 
to prevent Massachusetts from requiring exculpation for simply allowing a 
child to attend school, the court indicated that extracurricular athletics are 
“neither compelled nor essential,” and that “such a comparison does not 
necessarily follow.”180 
My position is that Sharon stands for the correct view that the public 
interest, in no way, is affected by the regulation of extracurricular athletics 
on the condition that liability be shifted from the school to the student athlete.  
Wagenblast would have come to a different conclusion had the court 
ventured beyond the boundaries of the suggestive factors laid out in Tunkl 
because the public interest, if any, associated with extracurricular athletics is 
not comparable to the public interest in education.  Instead, Wagenblast 
disposed of this discussion in one short paragraph,181 reflecting the lack of 
legal justification for its most important finding. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Unless the party seeking exculpation is performing a public service 
obligation182 or an essential service,183 it is difficult to determine whether the 
public interest is present and would be adversely affected through the 
introduction of a conditional exculpatory contract.184  Just as electricity, heat, 
and hot water qualify as a service of practical necessity to the public, and 
therefore are worthy of protection by the public interest, so too does 
education.185  It does not automatically follow, however, that the public 
interest in education extends to extracurricular athletics.  “[M]erely 
possessing inherent allure” does not elevate extracurricular activities into the 
necessary categories of a public school education itself.186 
 
 
 179  Sharon, 769 N.E.2d at 747 (noting that organizations that offer and run extracurricular 
athletics programs for minors without imposing a fee are exempt from liability for 
negligence). 
 180  Id. at 745 (emphasis added). 
 181  See Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968, 972 (Wash. 1988). 
 182  See supra Part III. 
 183  See Sharon, 769 N.E.2d at 745 (listing examples such as medical attention, housing, 
and public utilities). 
 184  See Wolf v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522, 526 (Md. 1994). 
 185  See Recent Cases: Negligence—Exculpatory Clauses—School Districts Cannot 
Contract Out of Negligence Liability in Interscholastic Athletics—Wagenblast v. Odesssa 
School District, 102 HARV. L. REV. 729, 734 (1989). 
 186  Id. at 34–35. 
